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Book Review 
The Way o/the Lord Jesus, Volume III: Difficult Moral Questions, by 
Germain Grisez. Quincy, IL, Franciscan Press, 1997, xxxi+927 pp. 
Hb $35. 
This is a big book. In general, a book requires a good excuse to swell to 
such dimensions, but in this case the reason seems proportionate. The book 
consists of a short introduction followed by two hundred particular moral 
cases, followed finally by two appendices. So, though the book is initially 
intimidating, it is not necessary to wade through all nine hundred pages 
before looking at the question that interests you. After reading the 
introduction (which is essential to understanding the book), one can browse 
or dip, select any question without having to read any other. This book in 
fact proves remarkably accessible, in many ways the most accessible of the 
series thus far, for it takes people where they are, with particular moral 
questions or dilemmas, and in a very short space develops the moral 
considerations relevant to finding some practical solution. 
Some might doubt the benefits of such a project. Surely every 
moral question is unique and particular practical problems cannot be solved 
from some simple manual. People have to make their own decisions from 
their own perspectives and there is no way that all of those details could be 
known in advance. Would it not be better to stop at the general level, with 
Christian moral principles, and let people work out the details for 
themselves? This objection fails to see the point of these moral questions. 
It is not that readers are expected to be presented with exactly this case, but 
that they need to learn how to deal with individual cases, often difficult 
cases. The importance of this book lies not in its answers but in its 
working. The only way to learn how to solve problems is to look at 
particular examples and apply, for oneself, the relevant moral principles. 
The main strength of the book is in the method used to approach 
these problems. This combines a sophisticated understanding of 
cooperation (as set forth in the two appendices) with a great flexibility in 
the principles applied to differing cases. Dr. Grisez is not a man in the grip 
of a theory. Rather, the scope of his account of basic goods and modes of 
responsibility gives room for a diversity of goods and principles to be 
discovered in the individual case. So the general theory is open to 
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refinement as particular cases show the need for other principles of 
responsibility or of judgment. The rejection of a single simple scale frees 
the presentation to genuine openness about the principles required in 
different cases. There is not here some apparently simple calculus used to 
rationalize decisions made on other grounds (as in the case of all quasi-
utilitarian moralists). There is rather a genuine attempt to understand the 
variety of goods, circumstances and principles relevant to each case. 
It is instructive to compare this work with that of earlier casuists. 
One difference immediately stands out. There is, in this volume, scarcely 
any attention paid to the probability of different opinions. An earlier 
generation of casuists concerned themselves excessively with which 
opinions were licit for Catholic moralists to hold. To defend any particular 
judgment, appeal was made to the opinion of various doctors (such as 
Aquinas, Vitoria, or de Lugo). If an opinion could find sufficient support 
among such doctors it was rendered probable. Concern then focused on 
whether any act could be undertaken if it was supported by some degree of 
probability, or whether only a more probable opinion could be acted on . 
Obviously all this abstracts from the actual goods or principles at stake, and 
interprets moral theology as a set of Church rules. Grisez characterizes this 
approach as legalism, and his presentation is completely free of legalism in 
this sense. His authorities are the gospel and the goods and principles 
which constitute reasons for acting or desisting from action. He refers to 
the documents of the Church only when they are relevant. His reasons are 
open for examination and can be accepted, rejected, or modified. 
The other feature that most distinguishes this treatment of moral 
difficulties from previous treatments is its form. This volume consists not 
in cases described in the third person and then analyzed in the third person . 
Rather it consists in a number of requests for advice and the subsequent 
replies. "Each case is presented by a conscientious person with a real 
moral problem who wants a reasonable answer to the question: What 
should (or may) I do?" (p. xxiii). This form is adopted no doubt because 
the first person reflection (What should I do?) is thought to be the basis of 
practical reason. Still another reason also shapes this form . The requests 
for advice are clearly thought of as a model for those who have some 
pastoral care, and may be asked for such advice. "This perspective - that 
of the conscientious person deliberating - should be adopted by a moral 
advisor asked questions like those in this book" (p. 849). The book is 
"intended primarily for use as a seminary text or instructional resource" (p. 
xv), that is, it is a text for advisors. This, in part, explains the form. 
The form chosen in the book is, I think, the root of its major failing. 
The form aims to accomplish two things, but ends up falling between two 
stools. The replies are thought of as though they were actual replies to real 
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characters (that is, in some pastoral situation). Yet of course the 
formulating of such a reply, on the basis of the question (thought of 
perhaps as a letter), is long distant from real personal engagement. No 
doubt this is a pleasant corrective to the non-directive "never ask questions, 
never give advice" school of counseling, but it cannot pass for a real 
pastoral engagement. The person himself (or herself) needs to be led 
gently to come to his (or her) own mind . This takes delicacy and time, and 
is a cooperative venture. During this there will be occasions for speaking 
clearly and for challenging or refusing to accept some false compromise, 
but even in this case it is a judgment of prudence when and how to speak. 
Dr. Grisez is well aware of this failing and, to his credit, devotes some time 
in his introduction trying to correct the impression that these replies give "a 
model for the process of pastoral moral guidance" (p. xxii). Yet how can 
they be viewed any other way when the reply explicitly addresses not the 
reader but the fictitious questioner? The replies do not (directly) give an 
analysis of what someone should do in such and such a situation. Rather 
they give an answer to the questioner, thought of as a conscientious seeker 
after advice. 
In the introduction, no doubt in response to criticism generated in 
the course of his researches, Grisez asserts "Packaged answers quickly 
delivered seldom help people with their actual problems" (p. xxi). Yet the 
answers given here cannot but be taken as attempts to answer, with a single 
relatively brief answer, the person ' s problem. For the answers are directed 
to the questioner! The rhetorical tone suffers greatly from the form into 
which it is forced . If one attempts to formulate a reply which is supposed 
to satisfy a genuine enquirer with a difficult problem, and must do so in 
five pages, it will be extraordinarily difficult to sound other than quick, 
glib, smug, harsh or pious, or all of the above. 
The title "Difficult Moral Questions" could refer to practical 
problems that were perplexing, or to those that were not perplexing but 
were emotionally arduous. This book is concerned with the former, though 
it would have been helpful to have more discussion of the latter. The 
whole question of the arduousness of solution seems underplayed, while 
even in perplexing cases it is emotional attachments which make the 
solution unappealing in practice. Of course, such gentle weaning of 
penitents away from bad habits and disentangling emotionally complex 
situations (where moral obligations are nonetheless clear) is a major focus 
of genuine pastoral engagement. This sort of gentleness fits ill with the 
form, and hence the style of this book, which therefore contributes to its 
apparent harshness. None of this is to deny the practical conclusions set 
out in the book, most of which I would agree with . It is rather a criticism of 
the way such advice can be given and so of the form of the present book. It 
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would have been far better to take the CritIcIsms acknowledged in the 
introduction seriously and write, for each case, an extended analysis for the 
reader - without pretending to meaningful pastoral dialogue with the 
questioner. 
The style also suffers occasionally from an element of jaundice 
with the perceived liberal clerical establishment. Again Dr. Grisez admits 
in his introduction that the priests (and religious) in the book are worse 
than average, for it is these worse clerics who generate interesting 
problems. Yet many of the comments which are made about Catholic 
universities, Catholic hospitals, bishops and priests in the book are hardly 
necessary. It seems that when Dr. Grisez applies some color to his 
examples the colors are often the same. Whether or not the situation of the 
American Catholic Church warrants this, it is bad rhetorically. Perhaps 
many of these examples are amalgams of true cases. Nevertheless the 
preponderance of cases of certain sorts certainly seems to be an attempt to 
persuade by rhetoric, rather than argument, and this becomes tiresome. 
This is unfortunate, for I imagine there are many who would be interested 
in this work (especially this particular work), but would be put off by the 
tone. 
Having criticized the form, I should add a note of appreciation for 
much of the method. One refreshing thing is the extent to which 
theological themes shape the general approach. Three large themes could 
be mentioned. First, mercy as a principle of Christian action is developed 
in many of the questions. In this volume, as in Volume II, it is asserted that 
mercy is obligatory, not supererogatory for Christians. Perhaps I could 
qualify this by agreeing that the habit or virtue of mercy is obligatory, and 
in some situations a failure to be merciful would be an offense against 
mercy (when presented by great need). Nevertheless I think that in general, 
mercy, like generosity, which is an allied virtue of large-heartedness, makes 
no sense unless it is gratuitous . A choice to be just but not (on this 
occasion), generous, is not an act against generosity, as seems clear in the 
Gospel (Matthew 20, 1-15). 
A second key theological concept at work throughout this volume 
(and, again, in Volume II) is the notion of vocation. Vocation becomes a 
central concept structuring one's obligations to others. This is shown 
across a whole range of cases, but see, for a good example, the concept 
cropping up in the analysis of advertising. "Thus, morally acceptable 
advertising arouses emotions that lead people to consider using a product or 
service that might help them fulfill some of the responsibilities of their 
vocation, while morally unacceptable advertising arouses emotions that do 
not serve that purpose but are more or less directly at odds with it." (p. 633) 
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This concept seems to me immensely fruitful for a spirituality drawing 
from the insights of the Second Vatican Council. 
A third theological concept that seems to playa structural role for 
the whole project is damnation. Many questions pay particular attention to 
the danger of leaving someone in sin unrepentant. Even victims are 
considered, as regarding any complicity they might have, and therefore 
what need they might have for repentance and reconciliation. Babies and 
unbaptized believers should be baptized if in danger of death. Hell is a real 
possibility and charity demands we do all we can, not only to save 
ourselves, but also to save others from futility . Thus the spirited attack on 
Hans Urs von Balthasar (p. 21-28) is not so tangential as it, at first, appears. 
For the real possibility of hell is a strong motivating force behind much of 
the book, and indeed the project as a whole. 
However, one argument of Dr. Grisez in this area is clearly invalid. 
He claims that because Jesus said that those who have done evil will go to 
perdition, then there will be people in Hell. If these threats remain 
unrealized the Holy Spirit "may have been bluffing, that is, may have 
lied ."! (p. 25) But I can say truthfully "Trespassers will be prosecuted" and 
yet hope that no one trespasses, and so no one is prosecuted. An officer 
may warn the soldiers under his command of the real danger of straying 
from the safe path across a minefield, and the danger is real , but he can still 
hope that everyone gets across safely. If fear of hell is salutary then 
perhaps some are saved from hell by the fear of hell. Hell is a real 
possibility for anyone who dies unrepentant in grave sin, yet we may hope 
that, by the grace of God, no one will die in such a state. Of course, we 
cannot know this, and must not be presumptuous, but neither can we know 
that there are souls in hell, and we must not despair, of ourselves or of 
anyone else. In short, I think that a healthy awareness of what damnation 
means and the real human possibility · of it, are salutary things, and it is 
good to see a moral theologian take them on board. However, I do not 
think impious those who hope that, in the end, all will be saved. 
Many of the questions in this book are genuinely difficult so that 
loyal conscientious Catholics might come to different conclusions. Dr. 
Grisez himself remarks, "no one who contributed to the book agrees with 
everything in it" (p. xxxi). 
Nevertheless, for the record, these are a few of the concrete 
judgments that, in this reviewer's opinion, are unacceptable: 
Surely everyone has a duty to feed himself or herself and care for 
his or her own bodily life except in the most extreme cases (of sacrificing 
one ' s own life for that of another). Thus it cannot be reasonable to make 
an advanced directive suggesting that " if he or she were in that [persistently 
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unconscious] conditions, no care be given, in order to save others the costs 
and other burdens of giving it" (p. 223). 
Is it true that becoming pregnant "has nothing to do with the good 
of marriage" (p. 242)? If a technician makes my wife pregnant with her 
sister's baby, this seems to compromise the bond of our marriage and the 
good of procreation. Pregnancy seems to be an intrinsic element in the 
procreative good of marriage, not only an element of child rearing that 
might be done by anyone. 
Should a young mother attached to her child and no danger to it be 
persuaded "to give him up" (p. 187), for what are, presumably, financial 
reasons? Dr. Grisez seems to seriously undervalue the good of knowing 
one's own self and one's own natural parents, even when this does not lead 
to any satisfYing relationship (cf. p. 189-192). He fails to give an account 
that would explain why those involved pressed so hard for a legal right to 
trace natural parents. In general his account of the natural bond seems too 
weak, and of the process of adoption too sanguine (which is not to deny 
that it can be the occasion of much good). 
I was shocked and thought scandalous the suggestion that a 
daughter should be encouraged to make a formal act of renunciation of the 
Church (p. 169), for the sake of having a valid marriage (when she would 
have been in good faith with regard to the invalid marriage). There was no 
account given of the grave wrong offormally breaking communion with the 
Church, and what formal cooperation with that wrong would involve. 
Finally, the suggestion that smoking was a "grave matter" (p. 60 I) 
shows up the cultural context in which it was written, that is, the American 
attitude to these things (and perhaps give a new twist to the adage "There's 
no smoke without fire."). Though there would seem to be little doubt that 
smoking is a vice, a decision about its gravity requires a more sophisticated 
account of risk than is given anywhere in this volume, or, with respect, in 
Volume II. 
There are no questions here involving war and deterrence, murder 
and self-defense, or capital punishment (this last to my great 
disappointment). Yet these topics may reasonably have been thought 
beyond the scope of the book, and have been treated elsewhere. Most 
curiously, what used to be thought of as the difficult moral question in 
medical ethics, the area of therapeutic abortion, ectopic pregnancy and 
craniotomy, is not treated here. This is surely deliberate and in the context 
of the subject matter of this book seems an unjustified omission, even 
though it has been treated elsewhere. 
This book made me appreciate more of what Thomas Aquinas 
meant when he said that, "In matters of action, practical truth or rectitude is 
the same only in what is common, not in matters proper to some person. 
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And even when the practical truth involved is the same, it is not equally 
known to all" (Summa Theologiae lallae Q. 94, 4). As we descend from 
general principles to particular conclusions, the particular circumstances 
become more important and the application of the principles requires more 
practical insight. Prudence only comes with maturity and requires the 
guidance of holy and wise examples as well as personal experience. It is a 
very ambitious project to set about answering so many particular questions, 
for it requires a deep understanding of the human practices involved. If I 
thought this task sometimes beyond the author, and some of the answers 
seemed lacking in nuance, that should not be thought too harsh a criticism, 
for serious reflection on so many diverse areas is a standard against which 
one would not wish to be measured oneself. 
In general this is a useful, serious book, full of insights into many 
(if not all) the principles involved in resolving the most perplexing of moral 
questions. It is certainly a great contribution to the neglected discipline of 
casuistry, and in many places was illuminating for the present reviewer. 
My hope is that this format - of many individual questions - will make 
this school of thought appealing to a far wider audience than has hitherto 
treated it seriously. The construction of the questions themselves is a 
service to those interested in exercising their practical reason, and for this 
alone the book deserves a wide welcome. This book is a substantial 
contribution to the field of moral theology. 
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